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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) has emerged as
a revolutionary paradigm to manage cloud infrastructure. SDN
lacks scalable trust setup and verification mechanism between
Data Plane-Control Plane elements, Control Plane elements, and
Control Plane-Application Plane. Trust management schemes
like Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used currently in SDN are
slow for trust establishment in a larger cloud environment. We
propose a distributed trust mechanism - TRUFL to establish
and verify trust in SDN. The distributed framework utilizes
parallelism in trust management, in effect faster transfer rates
and reduced latency compared to centralized trust management.
The TRUFL framework scales well with the number of OpenFlow
rules when compared to existing research works.
Index Terms—Software Defined Network (SDN), OpenFlow
(OF), Distributed Trust Management, Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI).
I. INTRODUCTION
The cloud networks are often distributed geographically
but for ease of management, they have built-in separation of
concern mechanism known as multi-tenancy. SDN has been
utilized by many cloud providers recently for network or-
chestration. Although SDN framework provides some security
applications, it was not created with security as end-goal in
mind.
SDN switches are known to cache the flow entries for flow
rules that have been installed in switch flow tables and only
new flows are sent to the controller. There are several security
attack vectors such as; a) Forged traffic flows that can affect
communication between the control plane and data plane b)
Lack of mechanisms to ensure trust between the control plane
and management plane applications [1]. A malicious insider
may take advantage of this fact and fill up the switch buffer in
effect creating a switch Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Another
scenario can be to generate a new variation of flow rules and
mounting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the
controller. OpenFlow is one of the most popular protocols,
which allows the incorporation of SDN capabilities in the cloud
network. OpenFlow switches consist of flow tables, which run
at line rate to allow traffic between data plane devices.
Scalability Issue in Centralized Trust Management:
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) standard based on ITU-T
recommendation X.509 supports the identification of trusted
users in the system, generation and exchange for the secured
key over the network and verification of authenticity of users
using a digital signature. PKI model based on DNS has been
proposed by IETF [2], where each tenant controls its operation
zone and operators or admin can define access control template
for tenants. On an average 3-4 messages are exchanged between
Certificate Authority (CA) client and server for key exchange
and 2-3 additional messages for digital certificate verification.
If we consider setup and verification time to be around 0.1s
for one client, the overall procedure will take several minutes
for a cloud network with 10000 hosts.
Additionally, applications with heavy traffic bursts can lead
to a slow performance in peak traffic situations because context
switch between user and kernel space is a costly operation.
DPDK [3] can be used to eliminate the context switch above by
using specialized drivers known as Poll Mode Drivers (PMDs).
The packets can be directly transferred between user space
and the network interface driver using PMD.
OpenStack based virtual infrastructure framework based on
Open vSwitch can be optimized to improve performance and
provide low-latency in packet processing using multi-threading
offered DPDK. The results discussed in DPDK driver show
packet processing performance enhancement by 2.5x times as
discussed in report [4].
If a trust management system like PKI is deployed in the
context of SDN infrastructure, the validation of traffic at data
plane and control plane level would be too slow for a large
multi-tenant cloud environment. We leverage the innovative
approach of using parallelized trust management to optimize
the setup and verification of trust management framework in an
OpenStack cloud network. Key contributions of this research
work are as follows:
1) Trust management framework in SDN to prevent mali-
cious insiders from mounting security attacks like denial
of service attacks (DoS).
2) Distributed setup and verification of trust in SDN
environment to reduce application overhead of PKI.
3) The forwarding latency of TRUFL is lower than exiting
research works NetSyn [5], SDPA [6] and Hassel [7].
Although Intel and 6WIND [8] have been using DPDK with
Open vSwitch to optimize packet processing, to the best of our
knowledge, no one has used DPDK for security provisioning
in a multi-tenant cloud network.
II. BACKGROUND
SDN supports different protocols, third-party applications,
and controllers. SDN can help an admin to centralize command
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and control of the cloud environment, a big concern is a trust
between various components in SDN itself. There can be
several ways in which trust can be violated by an attacker.
A rogue insider can add a fake switch, additional host nodes
which are not part of the SDN environment to achieve desired
communication.
It can be quite hard to detect trust violations in the SDN
framework. We need to ensure that flow rules across the
infrastructure are compliant with high Service-Level Agree-
ments (SLAs). If we utilize existing public key based trust
management systems in SDN, scalability will be a major
concern for large multi-tenant cloud networks.
A. SDN and OpenFlow
OpenFlow Rule: A flow table F of an OpenFlow switch,
can have rules, {r1,r2, ..,rn} Each rule consists of layer 2-
4 packet header fields, protocol (TCP/UDP/FTP), action-set
associated with the rule, rule priority, and statistics. We define
the flow rule using tuple ri = (pi, ρi, hi, ai, si), where a) pi
denotes rule priority, b) ρi denotes the protocol of the incoming
traffic (TCP/UDP) c) hi depicts the packet header, d) ai is the
action associated with the rule, e) si represents the statistics
associated with the rule.
The flow rule header space hi, consists of physical port of
incoming traffic δi, source and destination hardware address,
i.e., αsi,αd i, source and destination IP address, βsi,βd i, source
and destination port address, γsi,γd i. Packet header can be
defined by the tuple hi = (δi, αsi,αd i, βsi,βd i, γsi,γd i). Rule
statistics si, comprises of both flow duration and number of
packets/bytes for each flow rule si = (di,bi).
B. PKI Model and Components
PKI model we use mainly consists of the following
components:-
1) Certificate Authority (CA) is responsible for issuing and
revoking certificates.
2) Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Request for a certifi-
cate containing public key and ID to be certified.
3) Certificate - public key and ID bound by a CA signature.
4) Certificate Revocation List (CRL) - list of revoked
certificates, issues by CA from time to time.
5) Digital Signature - used to verify the identity of clients.
We have focused our attention on CA, CSR and digital
signatures in this work. We plan to discuss CRL in SDN
as part of future work. Other key terms used in this work have
been defined in OpenSSL document [9]. We have omitted
those definitions in text for sake of brevity.
C. Open vSwitch with DPDK - PKI Setup
As shown in Figure 1, Poll Mode Driver (PMD) can access
the network interface card of connected devices directly without
any kernel level system call. This saves significant time in terms
of context-switch. The input packets are received directly using
Direct Memory Access (DMA) by polling Network Interface
Card (NIC’s) RX buffer using PMD receive API. Similarly,
PMD transmits API is used to place output packets on the TX
buffer of NIC.
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Fig. 1. Fast Packet Processing and Trust Setup with DPDK
We have used PMD’s parallelized mode to allocate one core
on a physical server hosting Open vSwitch (OVS) for each
guest machine connected to Open vSwitch as a port. As can
be seen in the figure, we use parallel processing to setup PKI
infrastructure for each VM connected to Open vSwitch. The
Open vSwitch acts as a CA server and connected hosts are
acting as CA clients. PMD parallelization is used for PKI
setup and verification.
We achieved fast PKI setup using a) DPDK based fast packet
processing due to user-space operations based on DMA (no
context switch) b) PMD based parallelized key exchange and
verification for connected hosts.
III. RELATED WORK
There has been a good deal of work in identifying security
issues in SDN. Most of the work at present try to address
security issues from the flow rule violation aspect. There is,
however a limited focus on securing the overall framework
itself.
Trust Management in SDN: FortNOX [10] is a security
enforcement kernel that ensures role-based authorization
and security policy enforcement in the SDN network. The
authors describe different levels of security authorization i.e-
administrator, security applications, normal OF applications.
The flow rules are signed by the respective authorization role
using the digital signature scheme. The flow rules of higher
authorization level e.g., admin can override flow rule signed
by lower authorization role e.g., OF appreciation. Signing
and tracking of every new flow rule can, however, introduce
latency in the network. We have therefore used PKI to verify
the particular SDN elements and treat flow rule violation part
separately in our current work.
Authors in [11] discuss the new fault and attack plane
capabilities that are introduced by SDN infrastructure because
of centralized command and control which makes it easier for
attackers to exploit infrastructure. The paper highlights seven
major threat vectors including forged traffic flows, lack of trust
between controller and management plane applications, attack
on control plane communications. The paper recommends
maintaining a whitelist of trusted devices, autonomic trust
management and security domains to provide trust. We have
covered most of these desired features in current work via
better security design, PKI infrastructure and flow rule conflict
checking mechanism in a cloud network.
Distributed SDN Frameworks: Onix [12] facilitates dis-
tributed control in SDN by providing each instance of the
distributed controller access to holistic network state infor-
mation through an API. HyperFlow [13] synchronizes the
network state among the distributed controller instances while
making them believe that they have control over the entire
network. Attack graph based, scalable security solution has
been discussed by Chowdhary et al [14]. The paper [15] uses
architecture to support mapping between management plane
application and several controllers to tackle the issue of trust
in SDN controllers. The separate execution environment is
maintained for each controller, and incoming requests from
different controllers are compared for consistency before flow
rules are installed in OpenFlow tables.
One major security [17] issue with SDN is controller
acting as a single point of failure. FRESCO framework has
introduced modular decomposition of control plane logic into
several modules. These APIs are used for data sharing and
event triggering between these modules. This approach will
help improve the scalability and robustness of the system.
We have implemented similar logic in application plane
design where CAServer and Flow rule conflict checking
modules [18], [19] are separate and operate independently
of each other. Rendezvous-based trust propagation has been
discussed by authors [20]. A similar model can also be
incorporated for trust computation into SDN environment
where the destination node can compute the trust of the source
node via a recommendation of intermediate switches along
the path.
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
We consider a multi-tenant cloud architecture. Each tenant
will have a detection agent that is responsible for performing
intrusion detection. Figure 2 shows the OpenStack based cloud
framework where the VM’s are spanned across two compute
nodes. A centralized controller is responsible for controlling
and coordinating networking and storage elements.
Our SDN controller is part of the Control Node of Open-
Stack. The Opendaylight controller has several applications
as part of a management plane, e.g., Flow rule conflict
checker, one or more Certificate Authority (CA) to enforce
trust between different compute node elements. The controller
also comprises of other applications such as Network-based
Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) which mirrors data plane
traffic from different data plane VM’s using port mirroring
techniques. The NIDS uses neutron (network manager for
OpenStack) based APIs to provide NIDS functionality.
We primarily consider components which are part of the
SDN controller to check trust violations by misconfiguration of
flow rules or by the presence of rogue control and data plane
elements in this work. SDN controller makes use of Secured
Socket Layer (SSL) to communicate with Control Plane
elements (Open vSwitch) on each Compute Node. The system
is connected to the physical switch via an SSL connection as
shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. System Architecture
A. Threat Model
We consider the threat model based on two different variants
of attacks; a) Rogue insider is trying to send the malicious
traffic flow to switch. b) Fake switch trying to insert flow rules
in the switch using elevated privileges. We have not considered
a malicious outsider problem in this work because the traffic
from malicious outsider has to pass through additional layers
of a firewall to establish communication with high-value nodes
inside the network. Trust violation in such a case is quite
challenging for a malicious outsider. We have rather considered
the case where some node within a trusted intranet environment
has been compromised (rogue node) or some disgruntled
employee is trying to exploit the trust framework in the network
(insider threat).
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Fig. 3. Motivating Example for Trust Violation
We consider an architecture similar to the setup of hosts
and switches in a data-centric network. Typically, there are
multiple hosts connected by one or more switches. We consider
Cisco based OF Switch connected to two hosts and HP based
OF switch connected to two hosts.
The high level SLA defined by controller blocks traffic flow
between sub-networks 192.168.4.0/24 and 172.16.10.0/16 as
depicted in Figure 3. There can be several ways in which
a rogue insider or a compromised switch can bypass this
SLA to achieve communication between host 192.168.4.2 and
172.16.10.3.
Rogue Insider Attack: We consider a rogue insider trying
to bypass flow rule policy which denies his connection over
layer 3 (IP traffic) to another host. The attacker can mount
ARP cache poisoning or man-in-the-middle attack to spoof all
traffic from the victim’s machine at layer 2 using this attack.
∗|192.168.4.0/16|172.16.10.0/16|DROP(SLA) (1)
∗ : 00 : 0a : 01|∗ : 00 : 0b : 03|FWD HP(Switch1) (2)
∗ : ∗ : ∗|∗ : 00 : 0b : 03|ALLOW (Switch2) (3)
The rule 1 clearly denies any traffic between hosts with
provided IP range(1) , but rogue insider craftily sends traffic
to Switch 1 which is forwarded to another neighboring switch
as per rule (2). The Switch 2 accepts communication from any
mac address range to destination mac as per rule (3). Hence
malicious insider can use indirect policy violation to bypass
SLA.
Compromised Switch Attack: If the Switch 1 Cisco-OF-
Switch is a fake OpenFlow device (decoy of real OpenFlow
switch) in the network, the attacker can present a fake layer 2
port to the victim. The rogue switch can be used to directly
insert rule (4) using ”ovs-vsctl” commands.
∗ : 00 : 0a : 01|vlan1 7→ ∗ : 00 : 0b : 03|vlan1 (4)
The attacker here establishes a layer 2 tunnel for communica-
tion between the source and destination mac address. Multiple
opportunistic tunnels of this nature can be established by a
rogue switch to achieve resource starvation (DDoS) on the
victim machine.
B. Trust Model
We incorporate the chain of trust model in SDN
infrastructure to ensure the protection of entities which
are part of the data plane, control plane, and management
plane. We have considered hierarchical and decentralized
trust framework to secure SDN environment. The Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) based setup will ensure only legitimate
devices are allowed to establish data and control plane traffic
with each other.
1) Distributed Trust Model: We use the distributed trust
model in scenarios where the management plane application for
two security domains in consideration are different, e.g., load
balancing application and firewall application. We establish
Root-CA to issue local CA privileges to the controller node.
The controller node will in turn act as Control-Plane CA-Server.
The clients for the control plane will be OpenFlow enabled
switches.
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Fig. 4. Decentralized Trust Model
The Data Plane will have individual switches acting as
DataPlane CA-Server, as shown in the Figure 4. The DataPlane
CA-Server (OpenFlow switches) will be issued valid CA
certificates by Control-Plane CA-Server. The DathPlane CA-
Server will issue private keys to individual host machines. This
type of architecture will have a Bridge-CA which will allow
trusted management plane Root-CA to cross-certify each other
and in effect achieve a fully distributed trust architecture. The
SDN controllers responsible for different network segments
and can use Bridge CA for mutually authenticating each other.
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We used mininet [21] network simulator to test the per-
formance of the algorithm and to create a scalable network
environment. We used Opendaylight (ODL) SDN controller
running on different ports to conduct experiments. Each ODL
controller was responsible for managing one or more security
domains. We used a physical server with 16GB RAM and
4-core Intel i7 processor to conduct the performance evaluation.
The PKI infrastructure was set up using OpenSSL based APIs
to setup Certificate Authority (CA) and issuing private keys
to each control and Data Plane elements. The Open vSwitch
2.7.0 with support for DPDK was used. Some customizations
to the mininet module to support DPDK. We enabled support
for the netdev module in mininet. Poll Mode Driver (PMD)
allows parallelization of certificate creation and verification
on each host.
Algorithm 1, SDN-TRUFL, is used to establish and verify
trust between management plane applications, control plane
applications, and data plane elements. The root CA setup lines
1-3 sets up a CA server for the management plane. All the
controllers serve as clients to this CA server. Each controller is
Algorithm 1 SDN-TRUFL Algorithm
1: procedure SETUP-CA(caName)
2: cakey← createKeyPair(RSA, 2048).
3: careq← createCertReq(cakey, CN = caName).
4: procedure KEYPAIRSETUP(secDom, controllers)
5: for s ∈ secDom[] do
6: thread.create( setuCA(s) , CA-s).
7: for c ∈ controllers do
8: pkey← c.createKeyPair(RSA, 2048).
9: req← createCertReq(pkey, secDom.localCA).
cert← createCertificate(req, (secDom.localCA,
cakey),1, (0, 60*60*24*365*5)).
10: thread.create( setuCA(c) , CA-c”).
11: for sw ∈ c do
12: pkey← c.createKeyPair(RSA, 2048).
13: req← createCertReq(pkey, C.ControlPlaneCA).
14: cert← createCertificate(req, (secDom.localCA,
cakey),1, (0, 60*60*24*365*5)).
15: procedure VERIFYTRUST(net)
16: for link ∈ net.links do
17: pkey← open(PKI/link.intf1.pkey, ’r’).read()
18: cert← open(PKI/link.intf1.cert, ’r’).read()
19: pkey-cert← crypto.load privatekey(pkey)
20: dsign← crypto.sign(pkey-crypto , sha256)
21: crypto.verify(pkey-cert, dsign, sha256)
connected to one or more security domains. Lines 7-10 shows
the creation of the key pair (private, public keys) and certificate
for controllers. We have setup duration of the certificate to
5 years in the current algorithm as shown in line 10. The
SDN controller acts as ’localCA’ for control plane and issues
certificates and key pairs to switches as shown in lines 11-14.
We utilize parallelism to setup local CA’s as shown in line 11.
The trustfulness of any SDN element can be verified using a
digital signature of network elements for each security domain
and their respective certificates. The lines 15-21 show the
entire network can be probed for trust using public keys and
certificates to periodically verify the trust.
A. Distributed Packet Processing in Open vSwitch
We used poll mode driver (PMD) threads for each connected
host NIC separately. Each Open vSwitch was modified after
mininet topology creation to support netdev as shown for
switch s1 with port s1-eth1 below.
ovs-vsctl add-br s1 set bridge s1
datapath_type=netdev
ovs-vsctl add-port s1 myportnameone
set Interface myportnameone type=dpdk
Additionally hosts NIC were assigned two transmission and
receiver buffers to speed up packet processing and reduce
latency.
ovs-vsctl set Interface s1-eth1
4 hosts 16 hosts 64 hosts 256 hosts
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Fig. 5. Delay Tolerance in SDN-TRUFL Distributed Framework
options:n_rxq_desc=2
ovs-vsctl set Interface s1-eth2
options:n_txq_desc=2
VI. EVALUATION RESULTS
We conducted experiments to measure delay encountered
by hosts which are part of the network in packet transfer. The
network consisted of two security domains, each controlled
by one controller spanned across two virtual servers running
on a single physical server. Each virtual server had a separate
mininet based security domain. The controllers used SSL
communication to issue certificates and verify host machines
which are part of Data Plane.
A. TRUFL Trust Verification Latency with Number of Hosts
We calculated round-trip time delay for all hosts when com-
municating with each other in a fully connected hierarchical
PKI network of 4 OpenFlow switches. The root CA will verify
local CA’s in this setup. The time required for SDN-TRUFL
setup based with DPDK enabled and verification for 16 hosts
3.18 ms compared to normal OpenFlow SDN setup where it is
1.53 ms as shown in Figure 5. The latency involved in setup
and verification of Centralized-SDN framework in a network
of 64 hosts is 10.84 ms and latency for a network of 256 hosts
is 46.44 ms. The solution scales poorly as can be seen using
a direct adaptation of SDN-TRUFL infrastructure.
We overcame this scalability limitation using a parallel
approach using distributed packet processing on each Poll
Mode Driver (PMD). Each security domain was assigned a
separate thread for the creation of private keys and certificates
of each host and switches which are part of its security domain.
We observed that latency using Parallel SDN-TRUFL is around
1.74 ms for 16 hosts, 3.53 ms for the 64 hosts and 15.45 ms
for 256 host network after using parallelism. Although the
latency is still higher than normal OpenFlow network, we
achieved better scalability as compared to Centralized-Trust
implementation using single threaded computation.
B. End to End Reachability Latency Analysis
We compared the performance in terms of runtime latency
of our research work TRUFL vs Number of flow rules with
existing research works that focus on security analysis in an
SDN environment - NetSyn [5], SDPA [6] or checking network
properties such as forwarding latency - Hassel [7].
TABLE I
FORWARDING LATENCY FOR TRUFL, NET-SYN [5], SDPA [6] AND
HASSEL [7]
Number of
Rules
TRUFL
(ms)
Net-Syn
(ms)
SDPA
(ms)
Hassel
(ms)
10,000 7 25 130-
140
100
20,000 11 34 130-
145
1100
30,000 14 43 130-
145
3000
40,000 19 57 130-
145
5000
50,000 28 65 130-
145
6000
We checked the end-to-end reachability, which was a
common network property for the related work we examined.
As can be seen in the Table I, the number of OpenFlow rules
increase from 10k to 50k, the latency for checking forwarding
also increases for TRUFL from 7 ms to 28 ms. The latency
for 50k rules for Net-Syn was 65 ms, whereas for SDPA was
in the range 130-145 ms, the exact latency value deduction for
SDPA was difficult based on examination of their experimental
results. The latency value for Hassel is around 6s (6000ms)
for 50k rules. The faster verification of reachability is faster
in TRUFL since the use of distributed trust management with
DPDK speeds up the packet processing, hence verification is
in the order of few milliseconds.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The SDN infrastructure provides a great way of providing
network orchestration, management, and security. There are,
however, some security threat vectors that affect SDN infras-
tructure and network traffic management. We have identified
some important threat vectors as part of this work, including
rogue hosts mounting DDoS attacks, malicious switches and
controllers, and incorrect traffic flow rules. We proposed
TRUFL framework to provide distributed trust management.
Since public key cryptography based trust management is slow,
we utilized parallel computing to speed up the setup and trust
verification. The distributed trust management allowed fast
establishment and verification of trust in SDN environment.
TRUFL scales well with the increased number of OpenFlow
rules in an SDN environment compared to existing works -
NetSyn [5], SDPA [6], Hassel [7] when checking end-to-end
packet forwarding latency. We plan to extend this work and
include Group Based Policy (GBP) mechanism to establish
security policies across multiple tenants. The DPDK based
userspace packet processing can be combined with GBP
mechanism to allow modular security architecture in the SDN
environment.
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